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YOU'VE BUILT THE BRIDGE, WHY DON'T YOU CROSS
IT? A CALL FOR STATE LABOR LAWS PROHIBITING
PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ON THE
BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION
David E. Morrison*
The compelling interests, therefore, that any state has in
eradicating discrimination against the homosexually or
bisexually oriented include the fostering of individual
dignity, the creation of a climate and environment in which
each individual can utilize his or her potential to contribute
to and benefit from society, and equal protection of the life,
liberty and property that the Founding Fathers guaranteed
to us all.'
A kinder, gentler nation.2 That is what the United States has
offered to its 250 million citizens for the 1990s. The Americans
with Disabilities Act3 (ADA) took effect in 1992 for covered
entities including employers of twenty-five or more employees.
It extends protection to "some 43,000,000 Americans [with] one
or more physical or mental disabilities"4 who previously had
little legal recourse to address discrimination.5 In addition,
certain Americans will have the benefit of the 1991 Civil Rights
* Executive Note Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume
26, 1993. B.A. 1990, Indiana University; J.D. expected 1993, University of Michigan
Law School. I would like to thank Theodore J. St. Antoine, Professor of Law at the
University of Michigan, for inspiring my interest in labor and employment law and for
his helpful comments concerning an earlier draft of this Note. I also would like to
thank Mary Ann Hart, Phyllis Hurwitz, Steve Pearhnan, and Kathryn Rand for their
insightful edits and comments.
1. Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 37 (D.C. 1987).
2. President George Bush first adopted his "kinder, gentler' theme at the 1988
Republican National Convention, where he proclaimed, "I hope to stand for a new
harmony, a greater tolerance. We've come far, but I think we need a new harmony
among the races in our country. We're on a journey to a new century, and we've got
to leave the tired old baggage of bigotry behind." Jack Nelson, Bush Promises New
Caring Policies to Build on the President's Record, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1988, at 4, 7.
Bush repeated his pledge to the nation in his Inaugural Address, where he said his goal
was "to make kinder the face of the nation and gentler the face of the world." Julie
Johnson, Tough Words to Translate: 'Kinder and Gentler,' N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1989,
at A20.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 1990).
4. Id. § 12101(a)(1).
5. Id. § 12101(a)(4).
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Act,6 which also took effect in 1992.' This legislation strength-
ens federal civil rights laws regarding a person's race, gender,
religion, and national origin. Moreover, the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act 8 (ADEA), which prohibits employment
discrimination based upon age, provides protection for the
growing segment of our labor force that is over age forty. 9 On
the face of the law, therefore, one could conclude that America
finally is beginning to eliminate arbitrary and prejudicial
employment decisions which have prevented so many of our
citizens from fully enjoying their lives as Americans.
These civil rights laws, however, have not ended senseless
discrimination. The simple reason is that behind the civil
rights laws is the common law, which recognizes the
employment-at-will doctrine.10 This doctrine allows employers
and employees mutually to retain the right to end their
employment relationship without any explanation or notice. 1
6. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1991).
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
9. Ronald E. Kutscher, New BLS Projections: Findings and Implications, 114
MONTHLY LAB. REV. No. 11, at 3, 6 (reporting that the numbers of men and women in
the labor force aged 55 and over are projected to grow by 3.2 and 3.5 million, respective-
ly, between 1990 and 2005).
10. See generally Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contraqt at Will, 51 U. CHI.
L. REV. 947 (1984); Jeffery L. Harrison, The 'New" Terminable-at- Will Employment
Contract: An Interest and Cost Incidence Analysis, 69 IOWA L. REV. 327 (1984); Rhonda
R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in
the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979); Sherwin Rosen, Commentary: In
Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHl. L. REV. 983 (1984); Clyde W. Summers,
Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481
(1976); Symposium, Individual Rights in the Workplace: The Employment-at- Will Issue,
16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 201 (1983).
11. Courts continue to apply the employment-at-will doctrine. In Piekarski v.
Home Owners Savings Bank, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the
district court's finding of liability against an employer for discharging the employee.
956 F.2d 1484, 1496 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 206 (1992). The court concluded,
"Although [the employer] may have lacked 'good cause' to fire [the employee],
Minnesota is an employment-at-will state. Thus, neither a court nor a jury can second
guess [the employer's] decision unless [the employee] has proven all the elements of a
recognized cause of action." Id. For other examples of the continuing vitality of the
employment-at-will doctrine, see Crenshaw v. General Dynamics Corp., 940 F.2d 125,
128 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding the employee to be an "'employee at will,' subject to
termination at any time with or without cause"); Wilmer v. Tennessee Eastman Co.,
919 F.2d 1160, 1163 (6th Cir. 1990) ("Tennessee follows the employment-at-will doc-
trine."); Gilbert v. Tulane Univ., 909 F.2d 124, 126 (5th Cir. 1990) ("An at-will employee
is free to quit at any time without liability to his or her employer and may be
terminated at any time, for any reason or for no reason at all, provided the termination
does not violate any statutory or constitutional provision."); Darlington v. General Elec.,
504 A.2d 306, 309-10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (tracing the history of employment-at-will
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At its inception, 2 the common law provided employees with the
option of pursuing the "American Dream" by accepting new jobs
with different employers and climbing the ladder of success to
the top. Under the employment-at-will common law, employees
theoretically had the "freedom to quit" their job to pursue a
better career elsewhere. 13  The reality in the United States,
however, is that employment-at-will allows employers to
remove employees from their positions, or to deny applicants a
position, based upon the employer's mood or whim, 4 while
employees rarely quit voluntarily."
in Pennsylvania from 1891 to the present). See generally Summers, supra note 10, at
482-84; Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule That Employer May
Discharge At-Will Employee for Any Reason, 12 A.LR.4th 544 (1982 & Supp. 1992).
12. See Summers, supra note 10, at 485 (crediting the first announcement of the
rule to a late 19th-century treatise writer).
13. See Epstein, supra note 10, at 966.
14. Professor Jack Steiber found that
[slome 60 million U.S. employees are subject to the employment-at-will doctrine,
and about 2 million of them are discharged each year .... About 150,000 of these
workers would have been found to have been discharged without just cause and
reinstated to their former jobs if they had had the right to appeal to an impartial
arbitrator as do almost all unionized workers.
Jack Steiber, Recent Developments in Employment-at-Will, 36 LAB. L.J. 557,558 (1985)
(emphasis added). The Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1988),
provides an important limitation on the employment-at-will doctrine. The Act prohibits
an employer from discharging an employee for, among other things, engaging in union
activities. See id. § 158a(3); Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983).
In addition, most collective-bargaining agreements between management and unionized
labor have express agreements that management "may not discipline or discharge an
employee without cause, just cause, or ... for sufficient and reasonable cause."
MATrHEW A. KELLY, LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 47 (1987) (emphasis omitted); see also
Groves v. Ring Screw Works, Ferndale Fastener Div., 498 U.S. 168, 169 (1990) (finding
that the collective-bargaining agreement prohibited discharges except for "just cause");
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 401 (1988) (finding that the
collective-bargaining agreement protected the employees from "discharge except for
'proper' or 'just' cause"); McDonald v. West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 286 n.2 (1984)
(quoting the collective-bargaining agreement as providing "[tihe right to ... suspend
or discharge employees for proper cause"); Clayton v. International Union, United
Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers, 451 U.S. 679, 682 (1981) (finding that
the plaintiff had sought grievance arbitration because his dismissal was not for just
cause and therefore violated the collective-bargaining agreement); THEODORE KHEEL,
LABOR LAW § 62.06(2) n.25 (1992) ("[A] collective bargaining agreement of a unionized
employer... often will provide that an employee may not be discharged without cause
... ."). These just-cause provisions generally allow employees to challenge the employ-
er's disciplinary decision under a grievance procedure for final arbitration. See KELLY,
supra, at 47.
15. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform
Heads Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REv. 56, 67-68 (1988) (discussing industrial
relations); see also LLOYD G. REYNOLDS ET AL., LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 9
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Eventually, state and federal laws began to chip away at this
doctrine, providing protection for specific groups which were
especially vulnerable to employers' whims.'" These civil rights
laws prohibited employers from using protected statuses as the
bases for employment decisions, thus narrowing the breadth of
the employment-at-will doctrine. By limiting these laws to
specific groups, however, the legislatures have allowed
employers to continue to use the employment-at-will doctrine
to justify arbitrary employment decisions which do not involve
an employee's protected status. The need for expansion of the
existing laws to include protection for groups currently subject
to egregious discrimination therefore has not ceased.
Gay men and lesbians in particular are in need of protection
because of unceasing prejudice. Early in 1991, William A.
Bridges, the former vice president of human resources for
Cracker Barrel Old Country Store (Cracker Barrel), distributed
a memo to 106 stores in fourteen states declaring that Cracker
Barrel would no longer "employ individuals in our operating
units whose sexual preferences fail to demonstrate normal
heterosexual values which have been the foundation of families
in our society." 17 Eager managers quickly adopted the policy,
resulting in the firing of as many as twelve employees without
warning or severance pay.'" On one termination notice, filed
with the Georgia Department of Labor, the restaurant manager
wrote:
Employee was terminated because his mannerisms do not
reflect the behavior that we are looking for in a male
employee. He has stated that he is homosexual and as a
homosexual he does not fit into the traditional values that
we beleive [sic] in and try to project as a company.1i
(9th ed. 1986) ("Mlost workers regard resort to the market-that is, a change of
employers-as a disaster rather than as an opportunity.").
16. See supra text accompanying notes 3-9. See generally KHEEL, supra note 14,
§§ 62.04-.05 (discussing the many federal and state statutes which have limited the
employment-at-will doctrine). In addition to statutory protection, several common-law
theories of wrongful discharge have emerged in many states. See id. § 62.06 (discussing
the public policy exception, implied contracts, implied covenants of good faith and fair
dealing, negligent discharge, libel and slander, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, intentional interference with contract, and prima facie torts).
17. ReedJohnson, Sellin' Good Ol'SouthernHomophobia, GANNETTNEWs SERVICE,
Aug. 29, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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An even more concise termination notice stated that the
employee was fired for being in "violation of company policy.
The employee is gay."20 Unquestionably discriminatory, the
Cracker Barrel company policy outraged groups across the
country.2' Cracker Barrel responded to pressure by rescinding
the memo and stating that it no longer had a policy concerning
gay men and lesbians.'
The true outrage, however, is not merely what Cracker Barrel
did, but rather that what Cracker Barrel did was legal in all
but five states and the District of Columbia.2 A concern raised
by this incident, and others like it,24 is that for the few
employers that are caught with a "smoking-gun" memo and are
forced to reform their policies because of public outrage, many
more may discriminate against gay men and lesbians without
public notice and therefore may fail to adopt such reforms. The
Cracker Barrel incident demonstrated the need for legislation
that protects an employee' from discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, bringing the promise of a kinder, gentler
20. Dena Bunis, Fighting Discrimination Against Gay Employees, NEWSDAY, Sept.
21, 1991, at 15.
21. The group which seemed to voice the loudest opposition to Cracker Barrel's
policy was the gay-rights group Queer Nation, whose Atlanta chapter organized pickets
and demonstrations outside Cracker Barrel establishments. See Johnson, supra note
17. The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, an advocacy group based in
Washington, D.C., formed a "telegram hotline" targeting Cracker Barrel's chief
executive officer, Dan W. Evins. lI In addition to gay-rights groups, some stockhold-
ers expressed concern over the issue. New York City's comptroller, Elizabeth
Holtzman, and finance commissioner, Carol O'Cleireacain, wrote Cracker Barrel to
express their objections to the policy because the municipal employees' retirement fund,
which they oversaw, controlled 88,000 shares of Cracker Barrel stock. Id
22. Id. Despite its rescission, Cracker Barrel has refused to reinstate or provide
back pay to any of the terminated employees. See i&; see also 20/20: Whom Do You
Sleep With? (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 29, 1991) (transcript on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
23. Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and
Wisconsin all prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See 1991 Conn.
Legis. Serv. 91-58 (West); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512 (1981); HAW. REV. STAT. § 368-1
(Supp. 1992); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(1) (Law. Co-op. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 10:5-4 (West 1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.36(d) (West 1988).
24. Many other examples exist. Recently, a two-year-old internal memo surfaced
from the C.J. Sergstrom & Sons company which outlined how the firm could legally
continue to refuse to hire or promote based on sexual orientation. After this memo
became public, the company announced that its written employee policies had been
changed to specifically ban workplace discrimination against homosexuals. See Orange
County Perspective; The Best Answer Is Legislation, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1991, at B10.
25. Throughout this Note, I will use the term "employee(s)" to refer to both employ-
ees and applicants.
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nation to the substantial segment of the population26 who yearn
for its fulfillment.27
The call for legal reform to prevent discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation has been prevalent since at least the
1970s. 28 Part I of this Note examines sexual orientation as a
protected status at the federal and state level. Tracing the
development of case law interpreting Title VII, it is evident that
current federal laws have been of little use to gay men and
26. Over 40 years ago, one study concluded that "37 per cent of the total male
population has at least some overt homosexual experience to the point of orgasm between
adolescence and old age." ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE
650 (1948). It further reported:
10 per cent of the males are more or less exclusively homosexual... for at least
three years ....
8 per cent of the males are exclusively homosexual.., for at least three years
between the ages of 16 and 55....
4per cent of the white males are exclusively homosexual throughout their lives,
after the onset of adolescence ....
Id. at 651.
In 1989, the journal Science published a more contemporary study in order to
estimate better the proportion of the U.S. male population with homosexual
experiences. This report concluded that approximately 20.3% of all males had some
homosexual experience in their lifetime. Among the respondents who related some
same-sex experience, 11.9% indicated that their most recent contact was at age 15 or
older; 6.7% reported their most recent contact at age 20 or older. See Robert E. Fay et
al., Prevalence and Patterns of Same-Gender Sexual Contact Among Men, SCIENCE, Jan.
20, 1989, at 338, 346. "However, given the response biases that one can reasonably
assume to operate, this new figure might be taken as a lower bound." Id. Assuming
that the study is accurate, if the country's male population is approximately 125
million, then the gay male population is roughly between eight and 10 million. Studies
of women have also found a significant level of same-gender sexual activity. See ALFRED
C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 474-75 (1953) (reporting that
13% of women had "overt contacts to the point of orgasm" with other women); see also
Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 33 (D.C. 1987) ("We know one
basic fact-that homosexual and bisexual citizens have been part of society from time
immemorial. These orientations, like that of heterosexuals, have cut across all diverse
classifications-race, sex, national origin, and religion, to name but a few.")
27. Gays have shown their desire for a change by voting in large numbers for Bill
Clinton in the 1992 presidential election. See Jeffrey Schmalz, The 1992 Elections: The
States-The Gay Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at B8 (reporting that 72% of those
who identified themselves as gay or bisexual voted for Bill Clinton in the 1992
presidential election). President Clinton's efforts to make good on his campaign
promise to lift the military's ban on homosexuals may hold out hope to the gay male
and lesbian communities that the previous administration's promise for a kinder,
gentler nation will have new vigor in the next four years. See Eric Schmitt, The
Inauguration; Clinton Set to End Ban on Gay Troops, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1993, at Al.
This Note, while referring explicitly to gay men and lesbians, contemplates and
supports the proposition that protection against employment discrimination also should
extend to those individuals who identify themselves as bisexual.
28. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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lesbians.29 As a result, employment discrimination against
homosexuals has been widespread. °
Part II of this Note discusses how the foundation for reform
already has been created at the state level. This foundation
began with state legislatures' repeals of sodomy laws. This
decriminalization, or "legalization," of private sexual activity
should be recalled by states considering a prohibition of employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. State
legislatures also should note recent state actions to protect the
right of employees to engage in legal activities, such as
smoking, outside of the workplace. These legislatures have
voiced strong concerns for the right to privacy and the right to
work, which are violated when an employer makes employment
decisions based upon an employee's legal activity conducted
outside of work that does not affect his work performance.
Finally, Part III of this Note calls on the states that have
legalized private homosexual activity and have protected legal
activities conducted outside of the workplace to follow the
internal logic of their laws and protect employees from employ-
ers who discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in the
same fashion that employees who smoke are protected from
overintrusive employers. 31  By requiring employers to focus
more on on-the-job misconduct, and less on off-the-job, legal
activities, states can bring more of us a little closer to realizing
the promise of living in a kinder, gentler nation.
29. See infra notes 32-57 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 73-80, 90 and accompanying text.
31. There are, of course, many legal activities that an employee may engage in
outside of the workplace which one could argue should not be the proper concern of an
employer. Motorcycle riding, wind surfing, bungee jumping, and even having long hair
may legally, under the employment-at-will doctrine, be the basis for an employer's
decision to fire or not to hire an employee. A proposal for protecting all legal activities
from becoming an employer's basis for an employment decision would mean a major
modification, if not total eradication, of the employment-at-will doctrine; such a
proposal is beyond the scope of this Note. Instead, this Note singles out an employee's
sexual orientation toward lawful sexual practices from all of the other potential off-the-
job, legal activities because it is currently the basis for a large amount of employment
discrimination. See infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text. The same cannot be said
about all other legal activities.
Furthermore, this Note draws an important connection between sexual orientation
and actual sexual practices. This connection is essential, for it is the very same
connection which is drawn by employers who discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation: their disgust for an employee who potentially is sexually active with a
person of the same sex is the reason why employers discriminate against gay men and
lesbians. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20. This Note asserts, therefore, that
protection for employees must not rest on their actual sexual practices, but rather their
orientation to engage in those sexual practices.
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I. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AS A PROTECTED STATUS
A. Federal Law
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act' protects specific groups of
employees from employment discrimination. While Title VII
protects on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin,3 courts consistently have found that Title VII was not
intended to protect sexual orientation. In Smith v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co.,' the plaintiff argued that Title VII
prohibited an employer from considering an applicant's sexual
orientation in hiring, and therefore prohibited the defendant
employer from refusing to hire the plaintiff because of his
"effeminate" characteristics.' The court reasoned that there
are many freedoms offered to United States citizens, among
them the freedom "to do wrong."' The court found that the
intent of Congress in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964
regarding sex discrimination in employment was "the guaran-
tee of equal job opportunity for males and females." 3 1 Congress,
the court found, clearly had not forbidden discrimination based
on sexual orientation;' therefore firing the plaintiff because of
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988). The relevant language does not allow an
employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a).
33. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
34. 395 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ga. 1975), affd, 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978).
35. Id. at 1099.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1101 (quoting Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084,
1091 (5th Cir. 1975)).
38. The court supported its finding by noting that Congress was considering H.R.
5452, a bill forbidding discrimination based on sexual orientation. Until Congress
enacted such protection, the court refused to limit employers' freedom to hire. Id. at
1101 n.6. In Voyles v. Ralph K Davies Medical Center, a California federal district
court was emphatic in its opinion that Title VII simply does not speak to sexual prefer-
ence, "transsexual' discrimination, or any permutation or combination thereof....
Situations involving transsexuals, homosexuals or bi-sexuals were simply not
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his effeminate characteristics could be "wrong" only in a moral
sense. Absent a statutory proscription, the employer's actions
were legal. The plaintiffs complaint was dismissed for failure
to state a claim of sex discrimination. 9
Courts have refuted many arguments for extending Title VII's
protections to employment discrimination against gay men and
lesbians. In DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
Inc. ,40 the plaintiffs alleged that their employer publicly stated
that it would not hire homosexuals, and that their co-workers
and supervisors harassed them because of their
homosexuality. 4' The court refused to read anything but the
"traditional notions" of "sex" into Title V11 42 and therefore
refused to extend Title VII's protection to homosexuality. 43 The
court dismissed a disproportionate impact argument that
discrimination against homosexuals disproportionately affected
men because homosexuality is more prevalent in men and
because employers were more likely to discover homosexuality
in men than in women. 44 The court reasoned that to create
protection for sexual orientation under the artificial bootstrap
argument of protection for men in general would have
frustrated Congressional intent because Title VII was not
intended to protect sexual orientation.45 In addition, the
considered, and from this void the Court is not permitted to fashion its own judicial
interdictions." 403 F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975), affd, 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir.
1978).
39. Liberty Mutual, 395 F. Supp. at 1101.
40. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
41. Id. at 328.
42. Id. at 329. The DeSantis court cited Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566
F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977), for its finding of the congressional intent behind Title VII. In
Holloway, the court refused to read "sex" as including protection for one who was
undergoing a sex transformation. Id. at 662-63. The DeSantis court similarly held
that discrimination because of effeminacy did not fall under Title VII protection. 608
F.2d at 332.
43. Because the court gave considerable deference to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) interpretation of the statute which it was charged
to enforce, it was persuaded by EEOC decisions which found "that when Congress used
the word sex in Title VII it was referring to a person's gender' and not to 'sexual
practices.'" DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 330 n.3 (quoting EEOC Dec. No. 76-75, 1976 Emp.
Prac. Guide (CCH) J 6495, at 4266 (Dec. 4, 1975)).
44. DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 330-31. For a discussion of disparate impact, see Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431 (1971) (finding that a cause of action exists under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 based on a showing of a business practice which is not
overtly discriminatory, but rather has a discriminatory impact in its enforcement).
45. DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 330-31. But see id at 333 (Sneed, J., concurring and
dissenting) (arguing that if homosexual men make up a large portion of the male
population then there would not be an improper "bootstrap," and, therefore, the court
should not have dismissed their claim).
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL 26:1
DeSantis court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that an employ-
er's preference for females who prefer male sexual partners
over males who prefer male sexual partners was an illegal use
of different employment criteria for men and women.4" Finally,
the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that their employer
improperly considered the types of relationships that they had
with their friends. This argument failed because the types of
relationships which the plaintiffs sought to protect, homosexual
relationships, were not protected by Title VII.
4 7
While the DeSantis court's dismissal of many plausible argu-
ments for an extension of Title VII protection was a setback for
gays, perhaps an even more damaging decision to gay rights
was the Supreme Court's holding that the constitutional right
to privacy does not encompass private consensual sexual
activity between two adults of the same sex.4 In upholding the
constitutionality of a Georgia law criminalizing sodomy,4 9 the
Court refused to extend to homosexuals the same right to
privacy granted for family relationships,' marriage,51
procreation, 2 and abortion3" The Court further opined that the
right to engage in consensual sodomy is not protected
constitutionally as a fundamental right because it is neither
46. Id. at 331. For a discussion of the prohibition against applying different
employment criteria for men and women, see Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400
U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per curiam).
47. DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 331. Despite the ruling in DeSantis, the court in Wright
v. Methodist Youth Services, Inc. held that a gay male employer who fired a male
employee for refusing his sexual advances could be subject to a Title VII claim. The
court found that if the employee were not male, he would not have been subject to the
employer's sexual advances. 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. Il. 1981). While not on point
with DeSantis, the Wright case indicates that same-gender sexual harassment may be
covered by Title VII.
48. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986). See generally Norman
Vieira, Hardwick and the Right of Privacy, 55 U. CmI. L. REV. 1181 (1988) (arguing that
substantive due process cases are decided on an unprincipled basis because of
underlying doctrinal deficiencies).
49. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (Michie 1992) (prohibiting oral and anal sex between
any two persons).
50. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (finding a liberty interest
in the parental right to raise children).
51. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (recognizing marriage as a
fundamental right).
52. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (declaring
unconstitutional a state law which prohibited the use of contraceptives); Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (finding that procreation is a
basic civil right).
53. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (recognizing a right to privacy in a
woman's decision to have an abortion).
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"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"' nor "deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition."' The Court thus
applied a rational basis test to the law and upheld Georgia's
prohibition as rational because it was the sentiment of that
state's majority.' The Court's opinion could be the most
significant reason that the gay male and lesbian population has
not received legal protection at the federal level.57
Not only have past federal legislative efforts to prevent
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
failed, but a national attempt to reform employment law
arguably has left out protection for gay men and lesbians. The
Committee for the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws' Model Employment Termination Act (the
Model Act), after four years of meetings, drafted a model
statute protecting employees generally from employment
decisions not based upon "good cause."' This "good-cause" act
54. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
55. Id at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
56. Id. at 196.
57. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has stated,
If the [Supreme] Court was unwilling to object to state laws that criminalize the
behavior that defines the class [homosexuals], it is hardly open to a lower court
to conclude that state sponsored discrimination against the class is invidious.
After all, there can hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than
making the conduct that defines the class criminal.
Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Although the Ninth Circuit later reversed the decision, a federal district court in
California argued that Bowers did not require the application of only a rational basis
test:
Given the absence of controlling authority in this area, this Court holds that
classifications that disadvantage lesbians and gay men and impinge upon the
right to engage in any homosexual activity must withstand either strict scrutiny
because they impinge upon the right to engage in any type of homosexual activity
or heightened scrutiny because they disadvantage a "quasi-suspect" class.
High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1368 (N.D.
Cal. 1987), rev'd, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
If the federal judiciary will not protect gay men and lesbians from the states, there
seems little likelihood that it will protect them from private parties. Even if judges are
beginning to recognize a homosexual's right to engage in "homosexual" activity, that
recognition should supplement rather than preclude state prohibition of private
employment discrimination.
58. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT prefatory note, at 4-6 (1991). Final,
approved copies of this Act may be obtained by contacting the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 676 North St. Clair Street, Suite 1700, Chicago,
Ill. 60611.
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would put an end to the employment-at-will doctrine.5 9 The
Model Act, however, describes when off-duty conduct may be
relevant to the employer-when the conduct is "relevant to the
employee's performance on the job, to the employer's business
reputation, or to similar concerns"-in which case it may be
good cause for dismissal.'
Valid reputational concerns, however, have been left
undefined. Without any direction from the Model Act, a court
or arbitrator likely would turn to existing law to determine the
appropriate parameters. This approach, however, might
validate employment decisions based on an employer's concern
that its reputation for hiring gay men and lesbians will result
in the loss of clients or customers. EEOC Guidelines state that
a proper Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) under
Title VII may not be based on "[t]he refusal to hire an
individual because of the preferences of coworkers, the
employer, clients or customers."61 As Title VII only applies to
race, color, religion, sex, and national origin, an employer's
BFOQ would not be invalidated by a refusal to hire based on
sexual orientation. Thus, it is currently legal for an employer
to consider a client's or customer's preference regarding its
employees' sexual orientation. The Model Act's vagueness
severely weakens its attack on the employment-at-will doctrine,
as it may offer protection only to employees already receiving
statutory protection under Title VII, not to all employees. 2
Gay men and lesbians, once again, may be faced with invidious
workplace discrimination.
59. Id prefatory note, at 6.
60. Id. § 1 cmt. (emphasis added).
61. 29 C.F.R. § 1604(a)(1Xiii) (1992).
62. The Model Act limits itself by the following comment: "An employer's
discrimination in violation of applicable federal, state, or local law ... is inconsistent
with the requirement of good cause for termination." MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION
ACT § 1 cmt. (1991). This limiting language strengthens the need for state laws
prohibiting employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. An advisor to the
Special Committee on Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Employment Termination
Act, Mr. Eugene L. Hartwig, believes that the Model Act's language will be interpreted
by courts to prohibit businesses from considering one's sexual orientation, permitting
consideration only of concerns which affect an employee's on-the-job performance.
According to Professor Theodore J. St. Antoine, Reporter for the Committee, however,
the participants in the Conferences hesitated to afford protection for homosexual
employees. Interview with Eugene L. Hartwig, American Bar Association, and
Theodore J. St. Antoine, Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, in Ann
Arbor, Mich. (Jan. 28, 1992).
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B. State Law
In addition to federal civil rights legislation, most states
provide civil rights protection through state statutes. Often,
the state and federal statutes mirror one another in their
scope,' with major differences only in their procedural rules.'
To the extent that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not protect
sexual orientation and has not been extended judicially to offer
such protection, the same can be said of state statutes
mirroring the Act.65
States, however, have the power to go further than Congress
in enacting stronger legislation to protect gay men and lesbians
from employment discrimination. Five states have taken the
lead in such legislation. Wisconsin was the first state to
provide comprehensive protection to gay men and lesbians from
employment discrimination. 6  Since then, Connecticut,
Hawaii," Massachusetts, 69 and New Jersey" have followed in
protecting employees from discrimination based on sexual
orientation. The battle does not end, however, when legislation
is enacted, as pressure to repeal newly enacted statutes
generally follows. 7' These states are playing a leading role in
63. See BARBARA L SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 743
n.23 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing how many state statutes closely parallel analogous
federal statutes).
64. 1 - at 740. State statutes of limitation may differ significantly from the statute
of limitation under Title VII. Furthermore, nonpecuniary recovery under state law may
be tax free to the claimant, while a Title VII back-pay award will be taxed fully. Id-
65. One state court relied on interpretations of the federal Civil Rights Act to
refuse to extend protection to gay men and lesbians. See Gay Law Students Ass'n v.
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 611-13 (Cal. 1977) (refusing to extend protection
to gays under the state Fair Employment Practices Act); cf. Harvard Law Sch. Coalition
for Civil Rights v. President, 595 N.E.2d 316, 318 n.3 (Mass. 1992) (relying on case law
interpreting Title VII and therefore refusing to extend the protection of a state civil
rights statute to persons outside of the employment relationship); LaBore v. Muth, 473
N.W.2d 485, 488 & n.3 (S.D. 1991) (relying on federal court interpretations of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to support its refusal to apply South Dakota's Human Relations Act
to all forms of discrimination).
66. See WIS. STAT. § 111.36 (1989-1990).
67. 1991 Conn. Legis. Serv. 106 (West).
68. HAW. REv. STAT. § 368-1 (Supp. 1992).
69. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(1) (Law. Co-op. 1989 & Supp. 1992).
70. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 1993).
71. William Rubenstein, director of the American Civil Liberties Union's Lesbian
and Gay Rights Project, stated,
As long as there have been laws protecting gay people, efforts have sprung up
to repeal them .... It's a consistent theme in the civil rights of gay people that
we have to win twice. First we have to convince a legislature to protect our
rights, then we have to stop the repeal efforts from overturning the legislative
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building support for federal protection, but it most likely will
not be politically feasible for Congress to take affirmative steps
until a significant number of states have offered protection to
gay men and lesbians.7 Because most state and federal courts
have been unwilling to extend current civil rights laws to cover
gay mn and lesbians, and because Congress's hands will be tied
until states have passed legislation protecting them, it is
important that state legislatures take action now to stop the
invidious discrimination against gay men and lesbians in the
workplace.
The lack of protection for gay men and lesbians in private
employment has resulted in a great deal of employment
discrimination.73 Most companies that have strong equal-
opportunity policies do not provide specific protection for gay
men and lesbians.74 About two-thirds of gay men and lesbian
women have reported witnessing "some form of hostility toward
gay people on the job."7 A recent survey found that nearly
fifteen percent of gay men and lesbians had experienced some
form of job discrimination. 6 The forms of discrimination vary
but include termination, harassment, failure to promote, denial
protection. The battle is never over.
Don Terry, Minnesota City Renews Gay Rights Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1991, at
A18; see also Teresa M. Hanafin, Petitions Are Filed That Would Roll Back Gay Rights
Measure, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 8, 1991, at 34 (describing efforts to repeal the Massa-
chusetts law); Joyce Price, Gay-Rights Law Besieged; Religious Organizations File Suit
in Hawaii, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1991, at A3 (detailing efforts to repeal the Hawaii
law).
72. Massachusetts Representative Barney Frank, an openly gay member of
Congress, believes that Congress "won't be able to pass federal legislation [protecting
gays from discrimination] until a significant number of states [pass similar legislation]."
Bunis, supra note 20, at 15.
73. See Rivera, supra note 10, at 805; see also Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown
Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 35 (D.C. 1987) ("Despite its irrelevance to individual merit, a homo-
sexual or bisexual orientation invites ongoing prejudice in all walks of life, ranging from
employment to education, and for most of which there is currently no judicial remedy
74. Keith H. Hammonds, Lotus Opens a Door for Gay Partners, BUS. WK., Nov. 4,
1991, at 80, 81 (reporting that "just 20% of companies with strong equal-opportunity
policies explicitly cite sexual preference" as protected).
75. Thomas A. Stewart, Gay in Corporate America, FORTUNE, Dec. 16, 1991, at 42,
44.
76. Martha Groves, Frequent Job Bias Leaves Little Recourse, Gays Say, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 5, 1991, at Al, A27 (reporting the results of a survey by Overlooked
Opinion, a Chicago marketing research firm focusing on gay social and workplace
issues, of 6500 gay men and lesbians). Gay rights advocates estimate that only one-
tenth of gay employees are openly gay at work. See Hammonds, supra note 74, at 81.
Thus, the 15% figure should be seen as a conservative representation of the actual
discrimination which could be taking place.
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of benefits for domestic partners, and job refusal.77 The "glass
ceiling," above which few openly gay employees are able to
climb, is as prevalent for gay men and lesbians as for any
minority.78 Some gay employees, therefore, feel that they must
go beyond what a heterosexual employee would do in order to
succeed.'79 As gay employees have no stereotypical professions,
s8
the playing field upon which gay and heterosexual employees
compete is both vast and far from even.
II. LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR
REFORM AT THE STATE LEVEL
A number of states have laid the foundation for protecting the
gay population from employment discrimination through two
distinct legislative actions. The first is the repeal of state
sodomy laws, thereby decriminalizing private, consensual
sexual activity between adults and implicitly legalizing
homosexual activity. The second is the enactment of laws
prohibiting employers from considering whether an employee
smokes tobacco outside of the workplace in employment
decisions. This Note argues that those states that have
undertaken these two actions should follow the internal logic of
77. See Groves, supra note 76, at A27.
78. Corporate executives are hesitant to put gays in top-level positions. "In a 1987
survey by the Wall Street Journal, 66% of major-company CEOs said they would be
reluctant to put a homosexual on management committees .... " Stewart, supra note
75, at 45. The handicaps that gay men and lesbians face also extend to academia.
According to one report, "63% of the heads and chairpersons of sociology departments
stated that hiring a 'known homosexual' would produce 'serious problems' or that 'it just
could not be done.'" Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1575 n.141 (1989) [hereinafter Sexual Orientation and the Law]
(citing the Report ofthe American Sociological Association's Task Group onHonmsexual-
ity, 17 AM. SOCIOLOGIST 164, 164 (1982)). Many gay employees feel that they must hide
their private lives if they entertain any hopes of moving up an executive ladder.
Rebecca L. Walkowitz, Gay Executives: Despite Law, Many Say Job Security Still
Precarious, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 26, 1991, at 12, 13.
79. See Walkowitz,'supra note 78, at 12, 13.
80. See Stewart, supra note 75, at 43. A survey of 4000 gay men by Overlooked
Opinions found that "more homosexuals work in science and engineering than in social
services; 40% more are employed in finance and insurance than in entertainment and
the arts; and ten times as many work in computers as in fashion." Id. In fact, a 1988
Simmons study of subscribers to eight gay magazines found that gay household incomes
average $55,000-$23,000 above the national average. Gays, in addition, were three
times more likely than average Americans to hold professional or managerial positions.
I& at 54, 56.
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their laws and prohibit employers from basing employment
decisions on whether or not an employee has engaged, and
continues to engage, in private, consensual sexual activity with
another adult of the same sex.s l
A. Repealing Sodomy Laws
The repeal of sodomy laws in some states has made
possible the end of discrimination against gay men and
lesbians in the workplace. As noted previously, Bowers v.
Hardwick established the continuing constitutional validity
of states' sodomy laws.s' Historically, homosexuals have
been the victims of state-sponsored, and church-endorsed,
criminalization.m Until 1961, same-gender sexual activity
was prohibited in every state and the District of Columbia
through various sodomy statutes.' Illinois became the first
state to decriminalize all private consensual sex between
adults,'m adopting the relevant provision of the American
Law Institute's Model Penal Code.'m Since then, twenty-one
states have repealed their sodomy laws. 7 The sodomy laws
81. Because only sexual activity has been the subject of penal codes,
decriminalizing this behavior is an important and logical step toward protecting sexual
orientation (regardless of sexual activity) from being considered in an employment
decision. This Note, therefore, argues for protection based on the most distinct
homosexual characteristic, homosexual sex, but extends the protection for gay men and
lesbians by prohibiting all employment decisions of an employer which are in any way
based on sexual orientation. This protection should be extended beyond hiring and
firing decisions to include promotion decisions and harassment claims as well.
82. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
83. For a historical treatment of homosexuality, see Joel W. Friedman,
Constitutional and Statutory Challenges to Discrimination in Employment Based on
Sexual Orientation, 64 IOWA L. REV. 527, 529-31 (1979).
84. See Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual
Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 526 (1986) [hereinafter Right to Privacy Survey]
(providing committee reports, reports of legislative and committee hearings, penal code
commission reports, etc., involving state legislation regarding sodomy statutes).
85. Criminal Code of 1961, §§ 11-2, 11-3, 1961 Ill. Laws 1985-2006 (codified as
amended at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 11-2, 11-3 (Smith-Hurd 1979 & Supp. 1983)).
86. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
87. See Act of July 17, 1978, ch. 166, § 21, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws 118; Act of May
12, 1975, ch. 71, §§ 4-12, 1975 Cal. Stat. 131,133-36; Colorado Criminal Code, chs. 40-
3-403, 40-4-404, 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 388, 423; Conn. Penal Code, Pub. Act. No. 828,
§§ 66-91, 1969 Conn. Pub. Acts 1554, 1579-85; Delaware Criminal Code, ch. 497,
§§ 766,767,58 Del. Laws 1611, 1665-66 (1972); Hawaii Penal Code, Act 9, §§ 733-735,
1972 Haw. Sess. Laws 32, 90-91; Act of Feb. 25, 1976, Pub. Law No. 148, ch. 4, § 2,
1976 Ind. Acts 718, 733-34; Iowa Criminal Code, ch. 1245, §§ 901-906, 1976 Iowa Acts
260
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that remain on the books,' though rarely enforced, 9 still are
used to support employment discrimination against gay men
and lesbians.90
549, 558-59; Maine Criminal Code, ch. 499, §§ 251-255, 1975 Me. Laws 1273,
1297-1300; Nebraska Criminal Code, L.B. 38 §§ 32-38, 1977 Neb. Laws 88, 100-02; Act
of July 2,1973, ch. 532:26, 1973 N.H. Laws 999, 1010-11; New Jersey Code of Criminal
Justice, ch. 95, § 14:1-:3, 1978 N.J. Laws 482,547-50; Act of Apr. 3, 1975, ch. 109, 1975
N.M. Laws 265, 266-67; Act of Dec. 14, 1972, § 2907.01-.07, 1972 Ohio Laws 1966,
1906-11; Oregon Criminal Code of 1971, ch. 743, §§ 104-120, 1971 Or. Laws 1873,
1907-10; Act of Feb. 26, 1976, ch. 158, § 22-2 to -4, 1976 S.D. Laws 227, 260-61; Act
of 1977, Vt. Laws 51, § 3; Washington Criminal Code, ch. 260, § 9A.88.100, 1975 Wash.
Laws 817, 858; Act of Mar. 11, 1976, ch. 43, 1976 W. Va. Acts 241; WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 944.17 (West 1982 & Supp. 1984); Actof Feb. 24, 1977, ch. 70, § 6-63.1-.5, 1977 Wyo.
Sess. Laws 228, 228-30. The New York Court of Appeals ruled that New York's
sodomy statute violated the U.S. Constitution's right to privacy. See People v. Onofre,
415 NE.2d 936, 943 (N.Y. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
88. Private, consensual sex between unmarried adults remains a crime in 25 states
and the District of Columbia. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-1411, -1412 (1989); ARK CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie 1987); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 22-3502 (1989); FLA. STAT. ch. 800.02 (1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (Michie 1992);
IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1988); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 510.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 553-554 (1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.158, 750.338-.338(b)
(1979);MINN. STAT. § 609.293 (1982); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972);MO.REV. STAT.
§ 566.090 (1986);MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505(1992);NEV.REV.STAT.§ 201.190(1991);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1986); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 886 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 3124 (1983 & Supp. 1992); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-10-1 (1986); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-
120 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-510 (1991); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 21.06 (West 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361
(Michie 1988); see also Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 78, at 1519 n.2
(discussing the Massachusetts sodomy law). Massachusetts's sodomy statute
criminalizes anal sex, see MASS. GEN. L. ch. 272, § 34 (1986), but arguably was
invalidated as applied to private consensual conduct. In Commonwealth v. Balthazar,
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts found another statute criminalizing 'lewd and
lascivious acts" unconstitutional as applied to private, consensual adult behavior. 318
N.E.2d 478, 481 (Mass. 1974). The court specifically reserved deciding whether a
statute which explicitly prohibits specific sexual conduct would be unconstitutional. Id.
89. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F. 2d 375,382
(9th Cir. 1990) (Canby, J., dissenting) (arguing that sodomy laws are not enforced by
the states); REPORT OF THE CONNECTICUT COMMISSION TO REVISE THE CRIMINAL STATUTES
128-29 (1967) [hereinafter CONNECTICUT COMM'N REPORT] (reasoning that because the
Connecticut sodomy law was "substantially unenforced," it should be repealed),
reprinted in Right to Privacy Survey, supra note 84, app. at 646, 647; HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 707-730 to -742 (1976) (Part V. Sexual Offenses Introduction) (commenting that 'the
extremely limited enforcement that does exist raises the specter of discriminatory
enforcement"), reprinted in Right to Privacy Survey, supra note 84, app. at 648; Sexual
Orientation and the Law, supra note 78, at 1520-21 (noting that sodomy laws rarely
are enforced).
90. Georgia Attorney General Michael J. Bowers revoked an offer of employment
to attorney Robin J. Shahar after learning that she planned to wed her lesbian partner.
The Attorney General explained that he was "not going to hire someone who holds
themself out to the public by their (sic] own admission as being engaged in a homo-
sexual marriage." Georgia Denies Gay Lawyer a Job, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1991, § 1, at
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While not all sodomy statutes were directed on their face at
homosexual activity,91 sodomy laws traditionally have been
intended to criminalize this activity. 2 The effect of the repeal
of these laws, therefore, has been to "remove criminal sanctions
for acts among consenting adults." Generally, states which
repealed their sodomy laws adopted the position of the Model
Penal Code' that a secular penal code should not be used to
enforce purely moral or religious standards.95 The Connecticut
legislature, for example, specifically adopted the principle that
"sexual activity in private, whether heterosexual or
homosexual, between consenting, competent adults, not
involving corruption of the young by older persons, is no
business of the criminal law."96 Similarly, the Hawaii legisla-
ture commented that "problems, if any, presented by
homosexual behavior between consenting mature persons in
private are not likely to be cured by the continued use of the
criminal sanction and the sanction ought to be eliminated in
this context."97 The New Jersey sodomy law was repealed only
after its Criminal Law Revision Commission arrived at the
conclusion that "private homosexuality between consenting
adults not involving force, imposition or corruption of the young
28. Mr. Bowers previously had defended the state's sodomy law successfully before the
Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick. Id. The concerns of discrimination were
exemplified by another case, in which a woman in Dallas, Texas was denied a position
with the Dallas Police Department because she is a lesbian. Gay-rights groups chal-
lenged the Texas sodomy law for encouraging discrimination against gay men and
lesbians. Texas Appeals Court Rules Sodomy Law Is Unconstitutional, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 1, 1992, at AO.
91. See Right to Privacy Survey, supra note 84, at 524-25. Only six of the jurisdic-
tions which have sodomy laws specifically prohibit private homosexual conduct. See
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1988); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090(3) (Vernon
1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1991); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (West 1989).
92. See Rivera, supra note 10, at 942-45.
93. CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS, AB 489 (May 1, 1975) (amending in
relevant part CAL. PENAL CODE § 286 (West Supp. 1986)), reprinted in Right to Privacy
Survey, supra note 84, app. at 646.
94. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 & commentary at 362-67, 372 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962); MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.1 commentary at 207 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
95. See CONNECTICUT COMM'N REPORT, supra note 89, app. at 646; HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 707-730 to -742 (1976) (Part V. Sexual Offenses Introduction), supra note 89, app. at
647; OREGON SENATE COMM. ON CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE, MINUTES OF SB 40, ARTICLE
13, SEXUAL OFFENSES 1-3 (Feb. 24,1971) [hereinafter OREGON SENATE COMM. MINUTES],
reprinted in Right to Privacy Survey, supra note 84, app. at 655.
96. CONNECTICUT COMM'N REPORT, supra note 89, app. at 646.
97. HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-730 to -742 (1976) (Part V. Sexual Offenses Introduc-
tion), supra note 89, app. at 649.
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should not be an offense."98 The Oregon legislature also
expressed its intent specifically to decriminalize private
consensual activity between competent adults, whether
homosexual or heterosexual. 99 Based on these states' legislative
histories, any legislature which repealed the sodomy law of its
state must have understood that it was legalizing, though not
necessarily condoning,1°° private sexual behavior between
consenting gay male and lesbian adults.
B. Smokers' Protection
The argument that states should prohibit antihomosexual
employment discrimination draws support from an analogy
to laws prohibiting workplace discrimination against
smokers. Citizens of a state, as expressed through respective
legislative bodies, no longer may feel that a penalty should
be enforced against a person who engages in same-gender
sexual activity in private. Nevertheless, employers have
penalized these individuals through discriminatory
employment practices. 01 Similarly, smoking (for those of
proper age) outside of the workplace 0 2 traditionally has been
98. 2 NEW JERSEY CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMM'N, FINAL REPORT, THE NEW JERSEY
PENAL CODE: COMMENTARY 196-97 (1971), reprinted in Right to Privacy Survey, supra
note 84, app. at 651-52.
99. OREGON SENATE COMM. MINUTES, supra note 95, app. at 656.
100. OHIO CRIMINAL LAW TECHNICAL COMM., MINUTES 6 (Jan. 8, 1968), reprinted in
Right to Privacy Survey, supra note 84, app. at 655. The Ohio committee agreed that
consensual homosexual acts should not be criminalized. The motion to consider this
proposition was made by Judge Duffey, who had agreed with another committee
member that homosexuality might pose a threat to the moral stability of society and
the participants, but felt that problems with enforcement outweighed this concern. See
id.
101. See supra notes 73-90 and accompanying text.
102. Restrictions on smoking at work are common. See Restrictive Workplace Laws
Reduce Smoking, Protect Workers, Surgeon General Report Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 50, at A-3, A-4 (Mar. 13, 1992) [hereinafter Restrictive Workplace Laws] (reporting
that 31 states have restricted smoking at public work sites); Fred Williams, Burning
Issue at Work; Firms'Rules Put Smokers Under Fire, USA TODAY, May 1, 1990, at 1B
("Surveys by the American Society for Personnel Administration found 54% of
companies restricted smoking in 1987, up from 36% a year earlier. Today, 60% of
companies restrict smoking-and 24% of those ban it from the workplace ... ."). The
Department of Health and Human Services has set a goal of having smoking restricted
at 75% ofU.S. workplaces by the year 2000. Restrictive Workplace Laws, supra, at A-3.
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legal.' 3 Despite the legality of smoking at home, many
employers took it upon themselves to enforce a penalty
against smokers for engaging in this activity through
discriminatory employment practices."
Civil rights groups recently became outraged at the thought
that an employer could base an employment decision on an
employee's participation in a legal activity (smoking) outside of
the workplace.0 5 Such employer conduct evoked thoughts of
Henry Ford's management style in the early part of the
twentieth century.'06 Visions of Big Brother following an
employee home from work finally forced the issue upon many
state legislatures.' 7 While the tobacco industry generally has
led the charge against these discriminatory policies,'0 8 such
unusual bedfellows as the American Federation of Labor-
Committee for Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), the
Communications Workers of America, and the American Civil
103. Except for the period between 1895 and 1927, during which as many as 14
states had banned its use, the use of tobacco in the United States always has been
legal. See Steven Jonas, Solving the Drug Problem: A Public Health Approach to the
Reduction of the Use and Abuse of Both Legal and Illegal Recreational Drugs, 18
HOFSTRA L. REV. 751, 772 & n.156 (1990).
104. Nearly 6000 businesses not only ban smoking at work, but also bar smokers
from employment altogether. See Stephen Robinson, So Whose Lifestyle Is It Anyway?,
DAILY TEL. (London), July 22, 1991, at 17, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
105. See id.
106. Henry Ford took a keen interest in the off-duty activities of his employees. He
"used to send spies to his workers' homes to check they were not drinking, or to make
sure they had been to church on Sunday." Id.
107. Twenty-seven states have responded by passing legislation which provides
protection for either off-the-job smoking or general off-the-job legal activities. See infra
note 119.
108. According to one report,
The tobacco industry is a major player when it comes to campaign
contributions and lobbying. In New Jersey, 1990 lobbying expenditures by five
tobacco manufacturers and the Tobacco Institute amounted to about $265,000; the
tally for 1991, when the smokers' rights bill has stoked lobbying activity, will
presumably be higher.
Paula Span, Smokers' New Hazard: No Work; Health Costs Behind Job Bias Issue,
WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1991, at Al, A14. While critics charge the tobacco industry with
controlling the swelling smokers' rights movement, Tom Lauria, spokesperson for the
Tobacco Institute, an industry-funded lobbying group, said, "It's a fight for individual
rights. It's wrong to say we're behind it all." Julia Lawlor, Smokers Losing Battle but
Continue to Fight, USA TODAY, Nov. 21, 1991, at 1B; see also Peter Kerr, Bill Shielding
Smokers Wins Support, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1991, at B2 (discussing the lobbying
efforts behind the New Jersey law).
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Liberties Union (ACLU) have joined the fight. 109 These groups,
supported by the results of recent surveys," claim that restric-
tions by employers on the employees' right to privacy are unjust
and unfair. "We don't think your employer owns you," argues
the ACLU's Lewis Maltby. "Your employer has a right to
expect you to do your job well and respect the rules, but they
don't have a right to run your private life.""'
Employers' advocates argue that the smokers' lifestyle has
become too costly for corporate America. 12 Estimates of the
cost to employers vary widely. The Surgeon General estimates
that employees who smoke cost employers approximately $1000
per year in extra medical costs and lost productivity." 3 Others
claim "that it costs an employer $4,000 more per year-in
hospitalization insurance, lost work time and health effects on
non-smoking coworkers-to hire a smoker" rather than a non-
smoker." 4 While many companies have begun to invest in
health-promotion programs to reduce rising medical costs,"'
others have charged smokers (and other "high-risk" workers)
more for health insurance. 116
109. Interview with Theodore J. St. Antoine, Professor of Law, University of
Michigan Law School, in Ann Arbor, Mich. (Feb. 16, 1993). Lewis Maltby, head of the
ACLU's workplace discrimination office, believes that"the problem of employer nosiness
has got [sic] out of hand." Robinson, supra note 104, at 17. The ACLU, however,
remains uncomfortable with the new partnership with the tobacco industry which this
right-to-privacy effort has spawned. Id.; see also ACLU Spearheading Privacy Legisla-
tion, UPI, Mar. 22, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (citing the
unusual alliance between the ACLU and labor unions).
110. For example, a survey in Georgia showed that 97.5% of those surveyed oppose
employment policies which deny jobs to persons who smoke away from work. Georgians
Overwhelmingly Oppose Job Discrimination Against Smokers, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 4,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File and in WL, PRNews database.
"They didn't see the matter as one of smoking or not smoking," said Claibourne H.
Darden, Jr., president of Darden Research Corporation. "They looked at it as a
question of protecting an individuars right to privacy." Id,
111. Janny Scott, 'Smokers'Rights'Asserted Under New Job Bias Laws, L.A. TIMES,
July 23, 1991, at A5; see also Peter Kerr, A Victory in Trenton for Smokers, N.Y. TIMES,
May 21, 1991, at BI, B4 (reporting the agreement of organized labor with the ACLU
on the issue of protecting civil rights); Scott, supra, at A5 (same).
112. See generally Zachary Schiller et al., If You Light Up on Sunday, Don't Come
In on Monday, BUS. WK., Aug. 26, 1991, at 68 (discussing how companies are trying to
curb their employees' after-hour activities).
113. Lawlor, supra note 108, at lB.
114. Anti-Smoking Senators Urge Defeat of Hiring-Discrimination Ban, UPI, May
23, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
115. See generally Employers Using Wellness Programs to Help Contain Rising
Medical Costs, Pens. & Ben. Daily (BNA) (Dec. 4, 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File and in WL, BNA-PBD database.
116. Lawlor, supra note 108, at IB; Schiller et al., supra note 112, at 69.
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While some commentators argue that this policing of life-
styles is one reason to change fundamentally the way that the
United States finances health care,117 advocates for privacy
rights respond to the employers' health-care arguments by
saying that they are a pretext for violating employees' rights.1 8
This concern for the employees' right to privacy has led to the
passage of twenty-seven state statutes prohibiting employers
from considering the legal off-duty conduct of employees when
making employment decisions."1 9
In New Jersey, for example, Francis J. McManimon, the
main sponsor of the law"2 which prohibited employers from
discriminating against employees in hiring, pay, and working
conditions "unless the employer has a rational basis for doing
so," 2 1 said that he was moved by a desire to protect the right
117. Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr., No to Workplace Nannies, FORBES, Sept. 30,1991, at 26
("Employees, not employers, should get the tax breaks for health insurance premiums.
That way, individuals could make their own choices.").
118. See Robinson, supra note 104, at 17. Lewis Maltby argues that the health-care
costs are often bogus justifications: "We don't care if these policies save costs, it's the
principle we are fighting. Almost anything done in free time, from eating junk food or
red meat, to riding a motor-cycle [sic] or lying on a beach, could be said to affect your
health." Id.
119. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-601.02F(Supp. 1992); CO,. REV. STAT. § 24-34-
402.5 (Supp. 1992); 1991 Conn. Pub. Acts 271; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2855 (Smith-
Hurd 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-5-4 (West Supp. 1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.040
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 966 (West Supp. 1992); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 181.938 (West 1992);MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-1-9 (1992); Act ofMar. 26,1993,
1993Mont. Laws 193;NEV.REV. STAT. § 613.333 (1991);N.H.REV.STAT.ANN.§ 275:37-a
(Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:611-1 (West Supp. 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-11-3
(Michie Supp. 1992); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d (McKinney Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 95-28.2 (Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§ 500 (West Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 659.380 (1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 23-20.7.1-1 (Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-85 (Law. Co-op. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 60-4-11 (Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304 (1991); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 15.1-29.18 (Michie 1989) (public employees); W. VA. CODE § 21-3-19 (1992); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 111.31 (West Supp. 1992); WYO. STAT. § 27-9-105 (Supp. 1992). Bills passed by
state legislatures have been vetoed in Arkansas, Florida, Michigan, and Utah. New
Hampshire Legislature Approves Bill Banning Discrimination Against Smokers, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 97, at A-6, A-7 (May 20, 1991).
After the passage of the New Jersey law, Thomas Lauria of the Tobacco Institute
said, "It's good news for anyone who enjoys a legal, off-duty activity that their boss may
not approve of .... The bill intends to protect the right to privacy, not just for smokers,
but for drinkers, the non-athletic and overweight people." New Jersey Is Latest State
to Address Smokers'Rights, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, May 27, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Omni File.
120. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34-6B-1 (West Supp. 1992).
121. Id.
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to privacy.1' New Jersey Governor Jim Florio also "ex-
pressed concern over the issue of smokers' privacy, worrying
that an employer's ability to inquire about legal after-work
activity as a basis for employment violated privacy rights."1
Earlier in the year, however, consideration of the negative
health effects resulting from smoking persuaded Governor
Florio to veto a similar bill which would have provided civil
rights to smokers in the same way that civil rights laws
protect against job discrimination on the basis of race,
religion, and sex.'2 Moreover, the New Jersey Senate Labor,
Industry, and Professions Committee stated that employers
may continue to differentiate between smokers and
nonsmokers regarding insurance premiums for life and
health insurance benefits. 1'
The desire to protect employees' privacy rights was an
important reason why New York enacted its own law protecting
employees' participation in legal activities outside of the
workplace. 26 Senator James Lack, Chairman of the Senate
Labor Committee and a sponsor of the bill, opined, 'What you
122. McManimon explained, "Ifemployers are allowed to dictate off-the-job smoking
habits, they will soon be trying to tell us what we can eat and drink .... You still have
the right to live your own life." Kerr, supra note 111, at BI. More emphatically, he
said, "What people choose to do in their private lives is none of a company's business."
New Jersey Senate Dealing with Casinos, Smokers'Rights, UPI, May 19, 1991, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. McManimon's viewpoint was more persuasive than
the argument of the lone New Jersey state senator who voted against the smokers'
rights bill, Gabrel M. Ambrosio, who argued, "No other voluntary human activity
[besides smoking] is responsible for burgeoning health care costs . . . ." New Jersey:
"Smokers' Rights" Bill, GREENWIRE, May 22, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Omni File.
123. Kerr, supra note 108, at B2.
124. Peter Kerr, Smokers' Rights Bill Tests Florio's Power v. Tobacco Lobby's, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 1991, at Al. The current law merely supplements the state labor laws;
it does not amend the civil rights laws. New Jersey Assembly Approves Bill Prohibiting
Discrimination Against Workers Who Smoke Off the Job, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
101, at A-4 (May 24, 1991). "Nevertheless ... employees should not be subjected to
non-job-related inquiries about their activities outside the workplace, which amount to
an invasion of privacy." New Jersey Gov. Florio Vetoes Bill Barring Discrimination
Against Smokers, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at A-4 (Feb. 4, 1991).
125. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6B-1 committee statement (West Supp. 1992).
126. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d (McKinney Supp. 1993) (effective Jan. 1, 1993). New
York Governor Mario Cuomo vetoed a more sweeping bill in 1990 because it could have
posed problems for employers concerned with employee conflicts of interest and worker
discipline. The most recently incorporated provisions "protect employers against
violations of conflict-of-interest policies, revealing of trade secrets or habitually poor
performance or misconduct of a worker." See Dena Bunis, Rights Bill Inflames
Antismokers; Cuomo Gets a Measure to Protect Workers' Liberties Away from Work,
NEWSDAY, July 26, 1991, at 45.
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do in terms of legal activity outside of the workplace is really
not your employer's concern. " 127 As this was a primary concern
for other legislators as well,' s the privacy arguments won out
over arguments supporting an employer's right to reduce
health-care costs.' The New York law, however, allows
employers to make distinctions in health insurance premiums
where the protected activity increases the insurance risk.'1
Importantly, this adjustment must "reflect a differential cost to
the employer." 3'
In Illinois, a smokers' "right-to-work" bill survived despite an
earlier veto by Governor Jim Edgar of a similar bill protecting
alcohol drinkers' rights. The drinkers' rights bill was designed
to prevent employers and labor unions from asking applicants
questions about their drinking habits. 13 2  Governor Edgar
rejected the bill because he thought that an employer's need to
know about an employee's drinking behavior was essential in
some circumstances. 3 In supporting the smokers' rights law,
however, Edgar made sure that employers maintained the
ability to handle misconduct problems relating to drinking or
smoking; "[e]mployers should base discipline and discharge
decisions on conduct in the workplace,""3 not on the off-duty
127. Suzanne Bilello, Snuff Out "Lifestyle" Bill, Smoking Opponents Say, NEWSDAY,
Aug. 23, 1991, at 26. Senator Lack also asserted, "Political correctness seems to be
spreading itself into the workplace, or at least what an employer decides is correct
behavior for its employees. And that is absolutely wrong.... ." Bunis, supra note 126,
at 45.
128. Assemblyman Peter Abbate, sponsor of the House version, expressed similar
concerns: "I just don't feel [that discriminating against smokers is] proper .... I look
at it as any other discrimination." H.J. Cummins, Lawmakers Move to Protect Smokers'
Right to Hold a Job, NEWSDAY, May 19, 1991, at 87. Assembly Labor Committee Chair-
man Frank Barbaro, another bill sponsor, stated, -The purpose of this bill is to protect
employees against arbitrary and capricious employers. ... " Bunis, supra note 126, at
45.
129. New York business leaders argued that the creation of a healthier workplace
would help control health insurance costs. Bunis, supra note 126, at 45.
130. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(6) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
131. Id.; see also Michael Starr, NY Legal Activities Law Protects Employees, N.Y.
L.J., Sept. 3, 1992, at 5, 6 (discussing the meaning and ramifications of the new law).
132. See Ill. Law Prohibits Discrimination Against Workers Who Smoke Off-Duty,
29 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1487, 1488 (Nov. 18, 1991).
133. In his veto letter, Governor Edgar asked, "Should we prohibit an airline from
asking a pilot candidate questions about alcoholic and drug abuse? ... Is the
Legislature prepared to say it is irrelevant and illegal to initiate an inquiry of a bus
driver's alcoholic consumption patterns?" Id.
134. Id. Al Grosboll, executive assistant to the governor, further explained, 'There
is a substantial difference between the state telling employers-especially ones involved
in public safety operations-that they cannot ask questions about drinking behavior
and the state permitting an employer to fire somebody because that employee smokes
or drinks at home . . . ." Id
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behavior of the worker. In addition, the Illinois law allows
employers to classify workers "based on their drinking and
smoking habits for health and life insurance coverage
purposes.""3
The Indiana law'36 protecting workers' private lifestyles was
introduced after the Indiana-based Ford Meter Box Company
fired an employee after a urine test revealed traces of nico-
tine.137  The bill's author, Representative Vernon G. Smith,
described the issues surrounding the bill as essentially related
to privacy: "This situation is not a health issue. It is an issue
of whether Indiana citizens have a right to privacy .... Our
employers rent our time, they do not buy our lives. We cannot
allow employers to control our lives 24 hours a day.""~ The
depth of concern for protecting privacy rights, not the right to
smoke per se, was accented when Indiana Governor Evan Bayh
reminded the state that the law was to protect workers'
privacy, "not to glorify smoking or to give it any privileged
status."39 To this extent, Bayh agreed with the legislators who
pressed the health insurance concern,140 and assured companies
135. See id. at 1487-88.
136. IND. CODE ANN. § 22-5-4 (West Supp. 1992).
137. James Grass, GANNETr NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 26,1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File. For a detailed account of Ford Meter Box Company's firing of
Janice Bone, see Richard D. Walton, Privacy Issue Heats Up After Worker Is Fired for
Smoking, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept. 8, 1991, at 1.
138. James Grass, GANNETrNEWS SERVICE,Feb. 25,1991,available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omn File. Representative Brad Bayliff commented, "I think this [bill] takes
a reasonable step to establishing a policy that says what you do out of the workplace
cannot be regulated." Il State Senator Joseph V. Corcoran felt that the legislation
would present a minimal intrusion into employers' rights, while preventing greater
restrictions on workers' rights: "The extent of government intervention is to say that
your employer can't intervene in your life after you get off the job .... If that's
government intervention, it's good intervention. It's minimal intervention." James
Grass, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni
File. Governor Evan Bayh stated that "the law is intended to protect the privacy of
workers and to prohibit employment discrimination." Indiana Law Will Protect
Smokers from Employnent Discrimination, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 106, at A-9 (June
3, 1991).
139. Ed Stattmann, Bayh Signs Smokers' Rights Bill, UPI, May 8, 1991, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
140. Representative Kent J. Adams argued, 'Smoking is a detriment to one's health
and does affect the job productivity of an employee .... I think a company should have
that right (to monitor off-duty activity) from a health insurance standpoint." James
Grass, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 25, 199 1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni
File. State Senator Louis J. Mahern expressed concern that the state was "about to
take the leading cause of death in this country and enshrine it in the pantheon of civil
rights." James Grass, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 15,1991, available in LEXI S, Nexis
Library, Omni File.
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that they could set different rates for employees based on the
employees' outside activities.1 4 1 Indiana workers received even
more support from the state appellate court in Best Lock Corp.
v. Review Board,42 which held that an employer who fired an
employee for off-duty drinking, pursuant to a long-standing
employer rule, acted unjustly.143
III. THE CALL FOR LEGAL REFORM
In taking steps to protect an employee's right to engage in
legal activity outside of work, state legislatures favor the
employee's right to privacy over the employer's right to control
its workforce outside of the workplace. 1" The slippery slope
argument, which portends riding motorcycles, sunbathing,
eating junk food, or any other legal off-the-job activity as
potentially disfavored by employers, has been used to support
these privacy laws.1 45  In many states, private sexual activity
between consenting adults of the same sex is also a legal
activity.' 46  As invidious discrimination based on sexual
orientation continues to threaten the job security of many
employees, the concern of potential discrimination no longer
141. As Governor Bayh issued the law, he explained, "It is not discrimination
against people to require them to bear their fair share of higher costs resulting from
their own voluntary actions ... ." Stattmann, supra note 139.
142. 572 N.E.2d 520 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
143. The court explained, 'IIIn order for an employer rule. which regulates an
employee's off-duty activity to be considered reasonable, the activity sought to be
regulated must bear some reasonable relationship to the employer's business interest."
Id. at 525. South Dakota has codified a similar restriction involving tobacco use; the
law prohibits restrictions on the use of tobacco by employees during nonworking hours
unless such a restriction "[relates to a bona fide occupational requirement and is
reasonably and rationally related to the employment activities and responsibilities of
a particular employee or a particular group of employees, rather than to all employees
of the employer." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 60-4-11 (Supp. 1992).
144. In addition to the states previously discussed, see supra notes 119-43 and
accompanying text, Tennessee, Virginia, Kentucky, South Carolina, Oregon, Rhode
Island, and Colorado all have cited violations of individual privacy in passing laws
prohibiting employers from enacting discriminatory employment policies against
smokers. See Floridians Overwhelmingly Oppose Job Discrimination Against Smokers,
PR NEWSWIRE, Apr. 24, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File and in WL,
PRNews database (citing the findings of Citizens Advocating Privacy).
145. See Tony Mauro & Julia Lawlor, Businesses Focus More onEnmployee Lifestyles,
GANNEI'r NEWS SERVICE, May 13, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File;
Robinson, supra note 104, at 17.
146. See supra part II.A.
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should be considered a mere potential-it has become a reality.
This Note, therefore, calls on the legislatures of Illinois,
Indiana, Maine, New York, Oregon, 4 ' South Dakota, West
Virginia, and Wyoming (all of which have repealed their
sodomy laws and have passed right-to-privacy laws prohibiting
employers from considering employees' off-duty legal activities
such as smoking) to follow the internal logic of their laws and
prohibit employers from discriminating against employees
oriented toward lawful homosexual activity engaged in outside
the workplace.
There are many existing and potential internal consistencies
within these states' laws which support a law protecting an
employee's right to engage in legal homosexual activity outside
the workplace. First, the fundamental right to engage in legal
activities, as expressed by these legislatures, should be
extended to protect adults' lawful sexual practices. The policy
underlying the smokers' rights laws-that employees should be
able to live their lives without intrusion from their
employers' 48 -also applies to one's lawful sexual practices, the
most intimate aspect of one's private life. In addition, the
policy that employers should be concerned only with employees'
on-the-job misconduct, rather than with off-the-job legal activi-
ties, 49 directly supports a prohibition on employment discrimi-
nation based on one's orientation toward private, same-gender
sexual activity.
147. The people of Oregon already have expressed their views on this subject in the
last election. A ballot initiative would have amended the Oregon Constitution to
classify homosexuality as "abnormal, wrong, unnatural or perverse," and would have
prevented the government from taking any action that could be seen as promoting
homosexuality. See The Oregon Trail of Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1992, at A26. Fifty-
seven percent of the Oregon voters rejected the proposed amendment. See Bill
McAllister, Gay Rights Groups Applaud Clinton's Win, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1992, at
A30.
While gay-rights advocates hailed the victory in Oregon as "a rite of passage from
the margins to the center," the measure's supporters have vowed to return in two years
with a milder amendment, similar to the amendment that passed in Colorado. Id. The
Colorado amendment specifically prohibited "minority status, quota preferences,
protected status or claim of discrimination" for gays. Dirk Johnson, 'I Don't Hate
Homosexuals,' N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1993, § 1, at 24. Three Colorado cities with
antidiscrimination laws challenged the amendment in the Denver district court,
however, and Judge Jeffrey Barless found the amendment unconstitutional as violating
a fundamental right to protection by "'endorsing and 'giving effect' to 'private biases.'"
In Colorado, a Correct Decision, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1993, at AO. The Oregon
legislature should take the initiative before the next election and act to protect gay men
and lesbians in the state from discrimination.
148. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
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Second, by disallowing workplace discrimination against
tobacco users, these state legislatures indicated that the law is
no place for moral musings. By protecting smokers' rights,
state governments denied employers' attempts to determine in
which "politically correct" legal activity employees could engage.
Yet, while these states were protecting employees' rights to
smoke tobacco out of the workplace, surely these states were
not enshrining tobacco use as a morally correct action. In fact,
these states consistently refrained from condoning what they
had determined to be a lawful activity. More specifically,
through the smokers' rights laws, these states have established
that they do not intend to condone all legal activities that are
protected from private employment discrimination. If these
legislatures were to follow this internal logic, therefore, they
could protect those people oriented toward same-gender sexual
activity, without morally condoning the activity.l °
Another factor favoring the protection of homosexuals from
private employment discrimination relates to the frequency of
such discrimination directed toward both smokers and
homosexuals. As noted from the watershed of legislation across
the country in the last few years protecting the right of
employees to smoke outside the workplace, l"' the increasing
interest of employers in off-duty smoking"5 2 created the need to
protect the many victims of private employment discrimination
by law. Employers' discriminatory interests have not been
limited solely to an employee's off-duty smoking habits. In fact,
this discriminatory conduct has perhaps been centered as much
on people oriented toward homosexual behavior as on any
people who would engage in a nonstatutorily protected, legal
activity. The fact that gay men and lesbians constitute a
sizeable portion of the country" and can be found in many
employment fields"M underscores how widespread a problem
private employment discrimination against homosexuals has
become. While employment discrimination based on sexual
150. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (recounting Ohio's repeal of its
sodomy statute as based on concerns with criminal enforcement, not with civil
liberties).
151. See supra note 119 (listing the 27 states that have passed such legislation).
152. See Robinson, supra note 104, at 17 (finding that 6000 businesses ban smokers
from the workplace).
153. See supra note 26.
154. See supra note 80 (citing statistics on the diversity of gay employment). See
generally Stewart, supra note 75 (containing interviews with and descriptions of more
than one hundred gay men and lesbians in corporate America).
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orientation has been recognized and addressed by five states,
invidious discrimination continues to trouble gay men and
lesbians in the remaining states, and they, like smokers, are in
need of protection.
In addition, to be logically consistent, these state legislatures
should acknowledge that smoking is more dangerous than
homosexual conduct. 155 These state governments were able to
overcome the profoundly negative statistics concerning
smoking'5 to protect the right to smoke in the privacy of one's
home. Because smoking effectively kills many more people
than does homosexual activity, this Note argues that it would
be inconsistent and incomprehensible for the legislatures of
these states to distinguish employer discrimination against
homosexuals based on the negative effects relating to same-
gender sexual activity from discrimination against smokers. 157
155. Compare the more than 400,000 people in the U.S. who die annually from
smoking-related diseases with the total number of reported deaths resulting from the
acquredimmunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) virus--approximately 133,500. Center for
Disease Control, The Second 100,000 Cases of Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome-United States, 267 JAMA 788 (1992) [hereinafter The Second 100,000
Cases]. By 1991, there were a total of 206,392 reported cases of AIDS in the United
States, id, with 45,506 cases reported to the Center for Disease Control during 1991.
Center for Disease Control, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-1991, 268 JAMA
713 (1992) [hereinafter AIDS-1991]. Transmission of AIDS is still most common
among gay and bisexual men. See The Second 100,000 Cases, supra, at 788 (reporting
that 59% of all reported AIDS cases occurred among gay or bisexual men). The propor-
tion of reported AIDS cases resulting from homosexual transmission, however, has been
decreasing. Sixty-one percent of the first 100,000 reported AIDS cases occurred among
gay or bisexual men, while 55% of the second 100,000 reported cases occurred in this
group. Id; see also AIDS-1991, supra, at 713 (reporting that in 1991, 52.7% of the
reported cases occurred among gay or bisexual men, a decrease from 1990). An increas-
ing proportion of the reported AIDS cases has resulted from heterosexual transmission.
See The Second 100,000 Cases, supra, at 788 (reporting that among the second 100,000
reported cases, seven percent were attributed to heterosexual transmission, compared
to five percent in the first 100,000 reported cases-a 44% increase). To put these
statistics in context, one should note that in 1991, nicotine killed "more people than
cocaine, crack, heroin, alcohol, homicide, suicide, fires, car accidents, and AIDS
combined." Herb Robinson, It's Your (Cough, Gasp) Bill of Rights, SEATTLE TIMES, July
22, 1991, at A6 (quoting Dr. Robert Jaffe, head of the Washington state chapter of
Doctors Ought to Care) (emphasis added).
156. See OFFICE ON SMOKING & HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE,
REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING, at v (1989) (stating that "approximately
390,000 Americans died in 1985 as the result of smoking, even after two decades of
declining smoking rates"); Lawlor, supra note 108, at 1B ("Evidence pointing to the
dangers of second-hand, passive smoke is mounting. The Environmental Protection
Agency says it's a Class A carcinogen and kills an estimated 53,000 people a year.").
157. Some may argue that a community that tolerates homosexuality is harmed by
the inclusion of homosexuals. For example, one could argue that it is more difficult to
raise a family according to particular values and beliefs if the society tolerates a
person's right not to have her sexual orientation considered in employment decisions.
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Furthermore, having established that these internally logical
consistencies exist within these states' laws, that there exist
common characteristics between these two legal activities, and
that the existing pervasive discrimination against homosexuals
This argument carried great weight with the Supreme Court when it upheld the
constitutionality of state sodomy laws based on the "presumed belief of a majority of
the electorate ... that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable." Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
The Court's reasoning, however, supports the converse conclusion in states where
sodomy has been decriminalized. The majority sentiments about the morality of
homosexuality should be equally compelling: homosexual conduct is acceptable.
Therefore the moral corruption argument accepted by the Court is not compelling in
states which have repealed their sodomy laws, because it is not supported by the
majority view. See Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479, 481
(1989). For a thorough discussion of morality and law, see Symposium, Law,
Community, and Moral Reasoning, 77 CAL. L. REV. 475 (1989).
Moreover, any discussion of harm to society resulting from the toleration of gay
citizens' right to be free from employment discrimination is unpersuasive because the
harm to a community resulting from the toleration of homosexuality is speculative, if
existent at all. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 209-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that
there was no evidence in the record that private, consensual sodomy was endangering
anyone); Philip Selznick, Dworkin's Unfinished Task, 77 CAL. L. REV. 505, 510 (1989)
(posing the argument that "specific harms are not shown or are speculative"). The
argument against toleration asserts that toleration "will cripple a community's ability
to perform some crucial function." Dworkin, supra, at 487. But the most critical social
need that the community must provide is "security and the economic benefits of division
of labor.* Id. Not only is society's ability to provide these crucial needs unaffected by
the moral diversity of its citizens, see id. at 488, but to provide those needs to society
successfully, the community must respect moral diversity. The quest for moral homoge-
neity is an element that currently is crippling society's ability to provide economic
benefits to all of its citizens. As long as there is the ability to discriminate against
members of society based on their sexual orientation, society as a whole, and select
individuals in particular, are denied those fundamental economic benefits.
When Dworkin's view of community is expanded, one understands that "participation
in communities is mediated by participation in families, localities, personal networks,
and institutions. This 'core' participation preserves the identity and rationality of the
participants.... What we prize in community is not unity of any sort, but unity that
preserves the integrity of persons, groups, and institutions." Selznick, supra, at 507.
Within this framework is the difficult task of "holdling] in tension the often conflicting
values of autonomy and integration." Id. at 508. This Note espouses a policy of
preserving toleration in order to preserve the moral community. Those parents who
want their children raised according to particular values must be allowed to do so.
Selznick crystalized this ideal when he wrote, "Moral, aesthetic, religious, and political
pluralism must reject the idea of one right way, one right perspective, but should leave
open how many and what kinds of choices and tradeoffs are valid or justified." Id. at
511. Within this communitarian ideal, a religious society that abhors homosexuality
should be granted the autonomy to follow its religious precepts and not to employ gay
men and lesbians in their society. Parents in a religious society similarly can raise
their children according to these precepts. But religion is just one part of our society,
and when such children wander into our society, we may teach them toleration.
Thus, states which prevent private employers from considering sexual orientation
in employment decisions should exempt religious organizations from these laws. In so
doing, society can hold true to toleration, autonomy, and the moral community.
FALL 1992] Private Employment Discrimination
not only distinguishes homosexual activity from other legal
activities which states could protect from employment discrimi-
nation, this Note submits not only that these state legislatures
should follow the internal logic of their laws by prohibiting
private employment discrimination against homosexuals, but
also that these state legislatures should feel compelled to do
SO.
1 58
158. As many states have taken into account employer concerns over the rising
health-care costs of smoking by permitting employers to set different premiums for
employees based on employees' outside activities, the same employer concerns certainly
may be expressed concerning health-care costs related to homosexual activity. This
issue recently was thrust into the national spotlight when the Supreme Court let stand
a Fifth Circuit decision in which an employer was permitted to cancel almost all health
insurance coverage for an employee with AIDS. See McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946
F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992). The ADA did not apply in
this case because the discrimination took place before it was in effect. The courts have
not determined whether the ADA prohibits this type of discrimination.
Adding fire to the debate, Lotus Development Corporation recently announced that
it would offer its gay male and lesbian employees the same benefits for their long-term
partners as it does for the spouses of its heterosexual employees. See Thomas A.
Stewart, A Cutting Edge Issue: Benefits, FORTUNE, Dec. 16, 1991, at 50. The company
cited data from a "confidential insurance company study that says committed homosex-
ual couples are at no greater risk of catastrophic illness than are married heterosexual
pairs. Moreover, with few children in gay families, there are few claims for Caesarean
sections or routine pediatric illnesses such as ear infections and strep throats." Id.
Lotus convinced its insurance carrier that the cost of caring for an AIDS patient was
approximately equivalent to treating a coronary. See Hammonds, supra note 74, at 81.
Lotus's offer is limited to gay male and lesbian couples because heterosexual couples
have the option to marry, whereas gay men and lesbians do not. To qualify, gay male
and lesbian couples must sign marriage-like contracts with Lotus stating that they "live
together, intend to stay together, and are responsible for one another." Stewart, supra,
at 50. The contract is a legal document which binds the couples and their assets.
Bruce D. Butterfield, Gay Couples Get Family Benefits at Lotus, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 6,
1991, at 1, 8. If the couple breaks up, the employee must wait a year before registering
a new partner. Hammonds, supra note 74, at 81. "Lotus' research, which involved
contacting virtually every municipality that offered spousal-equivalent benefits,
indicated that there was no major surge in benefit expenses, even in areas with a
higher incidence of AIDS." Butterfield, supra, at 8.
A state truly concerned with the AIDS crisis could concentrate on identifying the
prevention of AIDS without enforcing morality on society by encouraging and
supporting safe, protected sex. The voluntary activity with which states and employers
should be concerned is unprotected sex, not same-gender sexual activity. A program
centered on education could keep legislatures from legislating morality and prevent
employers from engaging in the Big Brother detection tactics which the states have
disapproved of in the privacy laws protecting smokers.
A full discussion of health-care issues related to homosexuals is beyond the scope of
this Note, however, and deserves the attention of another, more substantive article.
See generally Joan Vogel, Containing Medical and Disability Costs by Cutting
Unhealthy Employees: Does Section 510 of ERISA Provide a Remedy?, 62 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1024, 1024-41 (1987); Karen A. Clifford & Russel P. luculano, AIDS and Insur-
ance: The Rationale forAIDSRelated Testing, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1806 (1987); Benjamin
Schatz, The AIDS Insurance Crisis: Underwriting or Overreaching?, 100 HARV. L. REV.
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CONCLUSION
The employment-at-will doctrine severely jeopardizes the job
security of most workers in America. State and federal laws
offer protection to many who may be affected by the arbitrary
nature of an employer's decision making. These laws recently
have been supplemented by many state legislatures which
sought to prohibit employers from considering their employees'
off-duty engagement in lawful activities when making
employment decisions. One group left unprotected from these
existing laws, however, is the gay male and lesbian population.
In states which have repealed their sodomy laws, private
homosexual practices are as legal as smoking, yet are less
threatening to society from a health-care standpoint. If the
privacy rights so eloquently advocated by these state
legislatures are to be applied consistently, they should be
extended to prohibit employers from considering their
employees' sexual orientation when making employment
decisions. The legislatures, therefore, should amend their
states' labor laws to add sexual orientation as another factor
that employers may not consider when making employment
decisions. These state legislatures would not stand for
anything less when smokers were the target of discrimination,
and they should take the same position with regard to gay men
and lesbians.
1782(1987); Mark Scherzer, Insurance andAIDS, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW
§§ 16.01, .02, .05[2]-[4] (Barbara J. Gilchrist ed., 1992).
